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This article provides theoretical and empirical evidence that local ﬁscal competition generates a bias toward low
business tax rates. Furthermore, it is shown that this bias is stronger for smaller jurisdictions. First, a theoretical
model is settled with private and public capital and a ﬁxed factor. The ﬁxed factor allows to consider diﬀerences
between the jurisdictions. The results show that there exists a bias toward low tax rates due to tax competition.
This bias generates an underprovision of public capital, and therefore production is smaller with tax competition
than with cooperation. Moreover, the bias toward low tax rates is stronger for jurisdictions with less ﬁxed factor.
That means that tax competition generates a larger production decrease for smaller jurisdictions. The empirical
part aims at estimating the bias toward low tax rates and its dependency with respect to the ﬁxed factor. Panel
regressions with temporal and individual ﬁxed eﬀects of the tax rates are implemented with French local data, using
the creation of intercity communities. The results indicate that the bias toward low local tax rates is strong: up to
23% decrease for the smaller cities. It is also signiﬁcantly decreasing with respect to the city size: there is no tax
rate decrease due to tax competition for the biggest cities.
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JEL classiﬁcation: H21; H25 ; H73; R12; R30.
11 Introduction
The level of decentralization is a crucial issue in state organization. For an example, France has
begun a decentralization second run since the year 2003. The ﬁrst run occurred during years 1982
and 1983. However, some local jurisdictions seem to be too much small to take proﬁt from the
decentralization. Thus, city unions also occurred since the year 1999. Hence, both decentralization
and centralization are processing. All developed countries have a decentralized authority. There
are several reasons to give local jurisdiction authority. Historical development is one of these.
Another important reason is that decentralized authority may make better choices concerning
public investments. The nearer to the investment the decision is taken, the more it ﬁts the needs.
Therefore, decentralization allows public investments to be more productive. Theoretically, Alesina
& Spolaore (1997) use this to build a model explaining the number of countries, with people
mobility and preference heterogeneity. Two forces act in this model. In the one hand, creating
more jurisdictions has a ﬁxed cost by administration. In the other hand, creating more jurisdictions
- and therefore jurisdictions with less people - allows local governments to take decisions closer to
the inhabitant preferences. Empirically, this result is conﬁrmed by Barankay & Lockwood (2007).
They study the case of education in Switzerland, ﬁnanced locally by the cantons.
However, decentralization is not free. Multiplying decision levels also multiplies the adminis-
tration costs. Furthermore, there may be costs due to local tax competition. Indeed, the diﬀerent
local administrations may enter a ﬁscal competition with their neighbors, which may result in tax
rate decreases and then in public investment decreases.
The aim of the present paper is to point out local tax competition. First, theoretical evidence
are presented. A local tax model is settled. It is a very classical tax competition model, which
demonstrates that local tax competition generates a bias toward low tax rates. The novelty is that,
due to decreasing factor returns, the bias toward low tax rates is stronger for smaller jurisdictions.
Then, empirical evidence conﬁrms the model results. The bias is estimated through French inter-
city agreement modiﬁcations. It is found strong (up to 23% for small cities) and signiﬁcantly
decreasing with the city size.
Some papers have already studied tax competition with a local point of view. Theoretically ﬁrst,
Zodrow & Mieszkowski (1986) build a model of local jurisdictions. Each local government chooses
the business tax rate as the best response to the neighbor rates and the national rate. Private
2capital elasticity is ﬁxed exogenously as a model parameter. It results in a business tax rates Nash
equilibrium. The authors ﬁnd that local tax rates are strategic complements. However, they do
not determine if local tax rates and national tax rates are strategic complements or substitutes.
B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e et al. (2005) introduce at an international level the idea of positive relationship
between tax and base. They explain it by public investment arguments.
Haughwout et al. (2004), Haughwout & Inman (2001) and Mutti et al. (1989) study calibrated
models. Haughwout et al. (2004) and Haughwout & Inman (2001) conclude that local taxes on
business activities are allready too much high in Philadelphia and New-York. Mutti et al. (1989)
calibrate a six regions model, and conclude that the relationship between rates and bases of local
business taxes may be ambiguous.
From an empirical point of view, Boadway & Hayashi (2001) study the case of Canada. They
estimate the tax rate decision interaction in a three provinces model: Ontario, Quebec and the
rest of Canada. Buettner (2001) does the same thing with a panel of German jurisdictions. Both
conﬁrm the fact that local business tax rates are strategic complements the ones to the others.
Furthermore, both ﬁnd that local and central business tax rates are strategic substitutes. Buettner
(2003) tests the impact of local business tax rates on local business tax bases in Germany and ﬁnds
it negative. Bell & Gabe (2004) measure the policy impact on new establishment location and ﬁnd
that additional public spending and higher taxes may be good to attract ﬁrms.
Thornton (2007) studies the link between ﬁscal decentralization and growth from a macroe-
conomical point of view. Measuring the decentralization by the full-autonomy ﬁscal revenue of
sub-national administration, he ﬁnds that there is no signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁscal decen-
tralization and growth.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical model is presented.
Subsection 2.1 presents the model without ﬁscal competition. It results in the ﬁrst best optimal
local business tax rate. Subsection 2.2 introduces ﬁscal competition and results in the second best
optimal business tax rate. The model ﬁnds a bias toward low local business tax rates generated
by ﬁscal competition, this bias is decreasing with respect to the jurisdiction size. In Section 3, the
data used for the empirical study is presented. The French inter-city reform is explained. Since
1999, some cities choose to sign an inter-city agreement to build a new administrative level: a city
union. Then, four data bases are presented. There is an inter-city union data base, a local tax data
3base, a local social properties data base and a geographical data base. In Section 4, the empirical
study is presented. The model parameters are estimated. With this estimates, the bias toward
low rate is calculated. It is found strong and decreasing with respect to the jurisdiction size. It
also shows that resolving the ﬁscal competition issue allows increasing the business local tax rates
without any negative impact on private capital settlement. In Section 5, conclusions are presented.
2 Theoretical framework
In order to understand the impact of tax competition on local corporate tax rates, a standard model
is settled. The novelty is to consider an asymetrical allocation of the ﬁxed production factor. It
allows to catch the city size impact on local corporate tax rate. The model considers a country
with a ﬁxed number of n cities. At each period t in each city i (i = 1..n), there is lit inhabitants,
kit private capital and pit public capital. These production factors allow private ﬁrms to produce
yit with the production function yit = F(kit,lit,pit). The production function used for this model is





it, with two kinds of capital, private and public.
No hypothesis is assumed on return to scales.
In order to focus on capital only, lit is supposed exogenous. There is a total amount of ﬁxed
factor Lt distributed irregularly among the cities. The point is to understand the impact of lit on
the local corporate tax rate τit. lit may be interpreted as land, that is really a ﬁxed production
factor. However, the number of inhabitants, considered in its static point of view, may be a good
proxy of the city size.
The public capital is ﬁnanced by local business taxation. City i taxes private capital kit at rate
τit and invest the revenue τitkit as public capital for the following period t+1. As public capital is
depreciating at rate δ, the public capital quantity pit at time t in city i is pit = (1−δ)pit−1+τit−1kit−1.
In each city, entrepreneurs borrow private capital and organise production. In order to maximize
employement and income for inhabitants, the objective of the city is to maximize production.
When a city tax rate varies, two phenomenon impact private capital. The total quantity in the
country K varies, and remaining private capital is reallocated betweens cities. Total private capital
K is the result of inter-temporal consumption optimization of agent utility u(ct,...,ct+k,...), where
ct is the consumption at period t, as much as the result of international capital partial mobility.
Therefore, the total amount K of private capital depends on the private capital returns. At period
4t, the impact of tax τit on public capital pit has not occurred yet. Therefore, the elasticity of K
with respect to τ do not depend on p. To measure this variation, the total capital elasticity with





Then, the private capital quantity kit in each city is the result of the total capital Kt allocation
between cities. This allocation is done in order to equalize the capital returns between cities.
Equation (1) is the condition for the capital returns to be equal in each city.
∂yi
∂ki
= g1 = Aαk
α−1






Where g1 is equal for all cities i. Equation (2) gives the resulting private capital allocation ki,

















Equation (2) gives ki as a fraction of K. Moreover, as
Pn
j=1 f(j) is not depending on city
i, the fraction of K is higher when f(i) is higher. The cities with more ﬁxed production factor,
more public capital or less taxes attract more private capital. The intensity of this attractiveness
is increasing with the productivity parameters α, β and γ. The private capital productivity α
impacts the low tax rate attractiveness. The public capital productivity γ impacts the public
capital attractivitness. The ﬁxed factor productivity β impacts the city size attractivitness.
Two ways of resolving this model are implemented. First, the optimization process is done in
order to maximise the overall production. It is the case of cooperation between cities, with no ﬁscal
competition. Second, ﬁscal competition may occur and each city maximizes its own production,
with using its own rate. The model is solved in Nash equilibrium.
2.1 Resolution with cooperation
This ﬁrst Subsection consists in resolving the model with cooperation between cities. This is a
three steps problem. First, cities choose a tax rate. Second, private capital owners choose where
they invest their savings. Finally, the production process is settled. The optimisation problem
without ﬁscal competition consists in determining the set tax rates for each city that maximizes
the overall production, under private capital settlement constraints. Resolution is done at the
5permanent equilibrium. Therefore, equation (3) gives the permanent equilibrium public capital, as





Thus, production in city i may be given as a function of ki and τi, as presented in equation (4).













i (1 − τi)
α (4)
As there is no ﬁscal competition, the goal of the optimization problem is to maximise Y =
Pn


































The left hand term of equation (5) is decreasing from +∞ to −∞ when τj goes from 0 to 1.
The right hand term of this equation is positive and ﬁnite. Hence, there exists a solution strictly
between 0 and 1. This solution is a maximum because yi is positive for τi between 0 and 1 and yi
is equal to zero for τi = 0 and τi = 1.
In order to calculate the optimal tax rates τ∗
i , condition (5) has to be simpliﬁed. Left hand
term of equation (5) is equal to right hand term of formula (6). Right hand term of equation (5) is
equal to formula (7) term. According to these two simpliﬁcations, equation (8) gives the value of





























































The main property of that ﬁrst best optimum is that all cities have the same optimal tax rate.
This tax rate does not depend on the number of cities and not either on the city sizes. The optimal
rate formula is composed of two diﬀerent terms.
6The ﬁrst term is
γ
α+γ and reﬂects the optimal ratio between ki and pi. This term comes from
the maximization of τ
γ
i (1−τi)α. Therefore, τ∗ is decreasing with respect to α because it represents
the private capital productivity in the Cobb-Douglas production function. The more productive
private capital is, the higher is the cost of taxing it. In addition, τ∗ is increasing with respect
to γ because it represents the productivity of the public capital in the Cobb-Douglas production
function. The more productive public capital is, the higher are the beneﬁts of taxation. As this
ﬁrst term represents an optimal ratio between private and public capital, it does not depend on
the city size.
The second term is 1
1+K, and represents the classical ﬁscal arbitrage between tax rate and tax
base. If base elasticity with respect to tax rate is high, optimal tax rate is low, and vice versa.
2.2 Resolution with ﬁscal competition
In this second Subsection, ﬁscal competition is introduced. The optimization problem consists for
each city in maximizing its own production, with its own tax rate as the only control variable. Tax
























When calculating this derivative, one have to notice that pi does not depends on τi. Equation
(9) measures the ﬁrm location reaction to tax rate changes, which does not take future public
investment into account because ﬁrm can delocalise in the future. Hence, choices are made as a
function of the tax rate and the still existing public capital. According to equations (2) and (9),
equation (11) gives the capital elasticity ki observed in city i, as a function of real capital elasticity





































7Local capital elasticity ki is then the weighted sum of two parameters, the real capital elasticity
K on the one hand and α
1−α on the other hand. In this local elasticity term, K represents the
capital saving variations, and α
1−α represents the capital moving from a city to another. The term
α
1−α is increasing with respect to α. It means that private capital runs away from a city to another
more easily when private capital productivity is higher.
The local capital elasticity ki could either be smaller or higher than the real capital elasticity
K depending on whether α
1−α is smaller or higher than K. The classical assumption is that local
elasticity is higher than real elasticity. When a city increases its business tax rate, not only some
capital is not saved anymore, but also some capital is relocated into other cities. However, the
opposite is also possible. Whatever the local capital elasticity is lower or higher than the real
capital elasticity, the diﬀerence between both elasticities is bigger when the cities are smaller.
At the permanent equilibrium, this local capital elasticity induces public capital variations with


























Resolving the decision to tax as a Nash equilibrium, the ﬁrst order condition for a city best
























The within brackets term is always negative when τi ∈ [0,1] and its limit when τi tends to 0
is ﬁnite. The other part of the left hand term tends to +∞ when τi tends to 0 and is decreasing
with respect to τi. Hence, equation (13) has a solution and this solution maximizes the production.
With introducing equations (11) and (12) in condition (13), the ﬁrst order condition (14) for the





















The second best optimal tax rate τo
i may be either higher or lower than the ﬁrst best optimal
tax rate, depending on K being higher or lower than ki. Whatever the second best optimal tax
rate is lower or higher than the ﬁrst best optimal tax rate, the diﬀerence between both tax rates
8is bigger when the cities are smaller. Under that hypothesis that K is lower than α
1−α, that is the
most probable hypothesis, the second best optimal tax rate is lower than the ﬁrst best optimal tax
rate. Tax competition is then producing a bias toward low local business tax rates. Furthermore,
this bias is higher for smaller cities. The cause of this bias variation is that the decreasing factor
returns are less constraining with a large amount of ﬁxed factor.
The point of the following Sections is to test the results presented in this Section, in order to
measure the bias toward low local business tax rates generated by ﬁscal competition between local
jurisdictions, and to conﬁrm its variation with respect to the city size.
3 Data
In order to calibrate the previous model parameters, econometrical work on French ﬁscal data is
implemented. More precisely, French taxe profesionnelle, is studied. It is the main direct local tax
on ﬁrms, and is yet based on capital. Before 1999, the taxe profesionnelle base was composed of
two parts, the ﬁrst part calculated on capital and the second part calculated on wages. Between
1999 and 2002, the wage part of the taxe profesionnelle base has disappeared. Therefore, data after
2002 are used to have the business tax base as proxy of private capital invested in the city territory.
The main source of variation used to calculate the estimates is linked with intercommunality
reforms. The intercommunality reforms consist mainly on the possibility for cities to unite (e.g.
Benard et al. (2004)). There were three local administrative levels in France. The smallest is the
commune level, they are the cities. There are more than 36000 cities, which makes a mean of 1700
inhabitants in each. Then there is the d´ epartement level. There are 100 d´ epartements in France,
which makes a mean of 360 cities in each. At the end, there is the r´ egions level. There are 24
r´ egions in France, which makes a mean of 4 d´ epartements in each r´ egion. Each level settles a rate
for the local business tax. The national ﬁscal administration calculates the business tax base and
levies the sum of rates, then redistributes.
There exists another administrative level: the EPCIs1 that are city unions. Some kinds of EPCI
have existed for long time, but the recent reforms encourage this kind of cooperation. There are
among 20 cities in each EPCI. The cities themselves choose to create a new EPCI or to enter one.
There is no obligation. Diﬀerent ways to ﬁnance the EPCIs are available. First of all, a fourth
1Etablissement Public de Coop´ eration Intercommunale
9business tax rate may be settled (EPCI with four tax rate, EPCI 4RT). They are mainly rural city
unions. Second, a unique business tax rate may be settled. The business tax revenue is shared
between the EPCI members and the other administrative levels do not receive business tax revenue.
Such EPCI are called EPCI with a unique business tax (EPCI UBT). They are mainly urban city
unions.
The choice of creating or entering an EPCI is clearly endogenous. However, the empirical work
will always use individual ﬁxed eﬀects, and compare the cities properties before and after entering
an EPCI. It does not consist in comparing city inside city-unions with cities outside city-unions.
For each one of the three years studied: 2002, 2003 and 2004, Table 1 presents the number of cities
for each category: outside any EPCI, in EPCI 4RT or in EPCI UBT.
[Table 1]
Table 1 indicates that signiﬁcant inter-city status variations occurred between 2002 and 2004.
The number of cities outside any inter-city agreement has decreased as the number of cities in EPCI
UBT has increased. The number of cities in EPCI 4RT has been stable. More precisely, no city
exited an EPCI. Outside EPCI cities enter both kinds of EPCI, and some EPCI 4RT city unions
adopt a Unique Business Tax system.
Concerning the local taxes, the data set used is “donn´ ees de ﬁscalit´ e directe locale”, compiled
by DGI2. Each tax is collected nationally then redistributed. Therefore, the national ﬁscal admin-
istration can compile rate, base and ﬁscal revenues for each local administrative level in each city.
Table 2 summarizes the overall business tax rates and business tax bases in French cities.
[Table 2]
Spatial standard deviations are all very high. The reason is the very high level of inequality
between French cities. The size is very diﬀerent from one city to another. The mean inhabitant
number is little higher than 1600 by city. However, there are a lot of much bigger cities, and even
more of even smaller cities.
The high temporal standard deviations are less obvious to explain. Nevertheless, this high tem-
poral variation is very important for the present study. As empirical analyses are panel estimations
2Direction G´ en´ erale des impˆ ots: French national ﬁscal administration.
10with individual ﬁxed eﬀects, the temporal variations for each city are the only source of variation
considered.
An important reform about the local business tax took place in 1999. This reform changed the
way of calculating tax bases. That could have been a problem if bases would have been calculated
diﬀerently one year from the previous in the data set studied. However, this reform ended in 2002,
so the present study is not impacted by this reform.
Another data set is used to determine the city properties: IRCOM3 data set. It provides a
summary of income tax declaration for each French city. As an example, there is information on
the number of ﬁscal declarations. This number is used as proxy of the city size. Indeed, the number
of inhabitants in each city is really known only after each census. There was a population census
in 1999 and the following in 2004. Census data source can not be used for yearly variation size.
Moreover, IRCOM data base provides information on income: both the amount and the kind of
income (wages, capital incomes, retirement pension...). According to this data set, the empirical
work can control for some sociologic composition variables for each city.
At last, a geographic data set is used. It provides the x and y coordinates of each town hall in
the Lambert projection. Thanks to this data set, distance between cities may be calculated, and
therefore neighbor values of the variables may be determined. The neighbor value of one variable
in one city is the sum or the mean of the values of this variable for cities closer than 30 kilometres
to the city considered.
4 Estimations
To estimate the bias toward low local corporate tax rate, it is necessary to ﬁnd variations in ﬁscal
competition. For that purpose, city status in term of EPCI member is used. Indeed, taking part in
an EPCI - and specially in an EPCI UBT - increases the cooperation with the other members. The
choice of entering an EPCI is clearly endogenous, but controling with city ﬁxed eﬀects allows to
compare only cities with themselves, before and after entering an EPCI. If a bias toward low local
corporate tax rates exists, the city rate relative increase should be higher the year of its entering
in an EPCI.
3Impˆ ots sur le Revenu des COMmunes: national income tax return agregated at the city level.
11Therefore, a dummy variable 1[i∈EPCI] is used as a regressor. Furthermore, a crossed variable
1[i∈EPCI] ∗ ln(Hbts) of this dummy and the city size (approximated by the number of inhabitants)
is used to catch the bias variation with respect to the city size. Hence, regressions (15) and (16)
are implemented.
ln(τit) = a + b1i∈EPCI,t + c1i∈EPCI,t ∗ ln(Hbtsi) + vt + ui + it (15)
ln(τit) = a + b11i∈EPCI4RT,t + b21i∈EPCIUBT,t + c11i∈EPCI4TX,t ∗ ln(Hbtsi)
+c21i∈EPCIUBT,t ∗ ln(Hbtsi) + ui + vt + it
(16)
These are panel regressions with both individual and temporal ﬁxed eﬀects. The individual ﬁxed
eﬀects allow to avoid an estimation bias due to the endogeneity of the EPCI entering or creating.
The temporal ﬁxed eﬀects allow to avoid an estimation bias due to conjonctural tax rate variations:
there has been an overall local tax rate increase at the studied times. Regressions (15) diﬀerentiate
the eﬀects of the EPCI entering depending on their ﬁscal integration (EPCI 4RT or EPCI UBT),
as regression (16) considers only the global EPCI category. Table 3 presents the results of these
two regressions.
[Table 3]
First of all, these results are very signiﬁcant. Quite all estimates are signiﬁcant at the level of
1%. Furthermore, the temporal R2 are high (28%), which indicates that the variables used for this
regression explain a large share of the tax rate variance.
Second, both regressions show that local tax rates increased after the city entered an EPCI. This
illustrates that local ﬁscal competition generates a bias toward low local tax rates. The business tax
rates increase when ﬁscal competition is diminished by inter-city unions. According to theoretical
results presented in Section 2, this also means that local capital elasticity is higher than the real
capital elasticity, which implies that α
1−α > K. This bias can go up to 23% for small cities.
Furthermore, f(i) is increasing with respect to the size of city i and
P
j6=i f(j) is decreasing
with respect to the size of city i. Hence, equation (11) implies that capital elasticity faced by small
cities should be higher than capital elasticity faced by big cities. This result is conﬁrmed by the
c coeﬃcients of regressions (15) and (16): these d coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly negative. It means
12that tax rate increase is lower for bigger cities, then the ﬁscal competition bias is higher for smaller
cities.
The previous results are true if considering all EPCI together or if diﬀerentiating for their ﬁscal
properties. When diﬀerentiating for the ﬁscal kind of EPCI, it appears that local business tax rates
increase more for EPCI with a unique tax rate that for others. Indeed, the ﬁscal competition is
more decreased in these EPCI, because they share a higher part of their local business tax revenues.
Moreover, the model presented in Section 2 assumes four parameters: α, β, γ and K. It is
possible to calculate them with a and b estimates. In that purpose, four equations with these four
parameters are needed. Two hypotheses can be made, that give two equations. First, constant
returns to scale are assumed: α + β + γ = 1. Second, classical empirical results state that the
value added distribution between labor and capital is 2
3 for labor remuneration and 1
3 for capital
remuneration. With the Cobb-Douglas production function presented in Section 2, it means that
β = 2α. Two other equations on α, β, γ and K are needed to estimate these parameters.
When cities are not uniﬁed into EPCI, ﬁscal competition occurs between the neighbour cities
and business tax rates are as in equation (14). Hence, the constant coeﬃcient of regressions (15)






If neighbor cities unite into EPCI, they protect themselves from ﬁscal competition and their
business tax rate is given by equation (8). Therefore, inter-city dummy coeﬃcient gives exp(b) = τ∗
τo











This gives the third and forth conditions on α β, γ and K. Therefore, these four parameter
values may be calculated, according to system (17).
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Table 4 presents the α β, γ and K estimates according to system (17) and regression (15)
results.
4It is for an inﬁnitely small city because there is also a cross variable (EPCI dummy and city size) in the regression.
13[Table 4]
These results indicate that public capital has a quite low importance in the production process.
This importance is however far from being negligible. The main important results concerned
capital elasticity estimates. The true capital elasticity K is only 0.15, which is weak. The capital
elasticity due to capital moving between cities is more important: α estimate indicates that this
elasticity is α
1−α = 0.44. The local capital elasticity is then found three times higher than the real
capital elasticity, which explains why local competition generates a substantial bias toward low
local business tax rates.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents the costs of decentralization. The beneﬁts of decentralization are the increase
of public capital eﬃciency: investment decision ﬁts more local needs if they are taken at a local
level. The costs are the decrease of public capital quantity: local jurisdictions compete to attract
capital, and ﬁscal competition generates a bias toward low local business tax rates. Low rates
induce low ﬁscal revenue, and consequently low public investments.
With model resolved at Nash equilibrium, the present paper presents how ﬁscal competition
generates the bias toward low local business tax rate, and attempts to measure it. Moreover the
decreasing factor returns in the production function induce that tax competitions has stronger
eﬀect on smaller city tax rates than on bigger city ones.
Then, the paper estimates the model results through French local tax data and gives evidence
of the bias toward low local business tax rates. Fiscal competition between French cities generates
up to 23% local corporate tax rate decrease. This tax rate decrease induces a public investment
decrease, which should causes a private capital investment decrease, because the private capital
attractiveness of cities (f(i) in the model presented here) depends on the amount of public capital
in the city.
Despite these negative eﬀects of decentralization, a majority of countries keeps a decentralized
administrative organization. This is because local decisions may ﬁt the local needs better, as in
term of inhabitants asking as in term of public investments. That for, it could be interesting to
compare this two forces - decentralization force due to eﬃciency of decisions and centralization
14force due to ﬁscal competition - in an optimal decentralization level model.
In addition, it seems that inter-city agreement should have a positive impact on business devel-
opment because it keeps political decision decentralized but it centralizes ﬁscal revenue. However,
two problems remain. First, there is the question of the allocation of the somehow centralized ﬁscal
revenue. Second, with the increasing importance of inter-city and other local taxation, perequation
questions may arise. Smart (1998) studies theoretically the impact of perequation and shows the
existence of a deadweight loss.
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16Tables
Table 1: French cities and there being in EPCIs
None EPCI 4RT EPCI UBT Overall
2002 number 8 409 15 302 7 907 31 618
2002 percentage 27 % 48 % 25 % 100 %
2003 number 5 954 15 343 10 321 31 618
2003 percentage 19 % 48 % 33 % 100 %
2004 number 4 509 15 597 11 512 31 618
2004 percentage 14 % 49 % 37 % 100 %
Notes: EPCI are city unions. The EPCI 4RT are less ﬁscaly intergrated than the EPCI UBT. There are more than
36 000 city in France. The present panel has only 31 618 because there is some lacks in diﬀerent data bases or years.
The main lacks comes from the geographical data base.
Table 2: Business tax rates and bases
Mean Standard Spatial Temporal
deviation standard standard
deviation deviation
Rates 21.0 % 7.2 % 6.4 % 3.3 %
Bases 2.4 16.2 16.1 1.8
City part 28 % 25 % 22 % 11 %
EPCI part 51 % 17 % 14 % 9 %
Rates (vs neighbors) 100 % 27 % 23 % 13 %
Bases (vs neighbors) 0.66 % 3.31 % 3.29 % 0.32 %
Notes: The tax base unity is million of euros. Rates vs neighbors is the ratio between the city rate and the mean
rate among cities closer than 30 kilometers. Therefore, rate vs neighbors mean is 1. Bases vs neighbors is the ratio
between the city base and the total base among the city not farer than 30 kilometers. Therefore, base vs neighbors










EPCI 4RT b1 0.168***
(0.047)
EPCI 4RT*Inhabitants c1 -0.013
(0.008)
EPCI UBT b2 0.215***
(0.047)
EPCI UBT*Inhabitants c2 -0.029***
(0.008)
Observations 51 444 51 444
Temporal R2 28 % 28 %
Spatial R2 2 % 1 %
Overall R2 9 % 8 %
Notes: ***: signiﬁcant at 1%, **: signiﬁcant at 5%, *: signiﬁcant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4: Parameter estimates
α β γ K
0.31 0.61 0.08 0.15
Notes: These are the estimation of the parameters of the Section 2 model. These estimation are made through
regression (15) and hypotheses system (17).
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